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Résumé
Dans un article souvent cité, Genesove and Mayer (2001) observent
que les vendeurs sur le marché immobilier sont réticents à vendre à
perte par rapport à leur prix d’achat, et attribuent ce phénomène à
l’aversion pour la perte. Je montre que l’aversion pour la perte ne peut
pas expliquer ce phénomène.
Abstract
In an often quoted article, Genesove and Mayer (2001) observe
that house sellers are reluctant to sell at a loss, and attribute this
finding to loss aversion. I show that loss aversion cannot explain this
phenomenon.
JEL classification numbers: D03, D11, D83.
Mots-clés : Aversion pour la perte, théorie des perspectives, marché
immobilier.
Keywords: Loss aversion, prospect theory, housing market.
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1 Introduction
Genesove and Mayer (2001) observe on Boston’s housing market data
that house sellers are reluctant to sell at a loss relative to their former buy-
ing price. They attribute this phenomenon informally to loss aversion and
consider it as the housing market version of the disposition effect. The dis-
position effect is a behavioral anomaly in finance: people have a tendency to
sell winners and hold losers, even when the contrary would be more efficient.
The disposition effect has also been attributed to loss aversion (Shefrin and
Statman (1985)), but only informally.
I build a two-periods model of search with loss aversion and show that loss
aversion cannot explain the observed phenomenon: introducing loss aversion
in the model actually decreases the reservation value of the agent, i.e. he is
willing to accept lower offers.
I then discuss the phenomenon observed by Genesove and Mayer (2001),
and suggest, based on the existing literature, that anchoring is a better ex-
planation of it.
2 Prospect Theory in a Two-periods setting
We consider an agent who draws an offer from a probability distribution,
with CDF F (x) and PDF f(x) on an interval I = [xmin, xmax]. If she re-
fuses the first offer, she can draw an other offer (noted y) that will be final.
The second draw is independent from the first. Any second-period offer is
discounted relative to first-period offers at a rate β, and utility is linear:
u(x) = x.
The value of having the first offer x is
V (x) = max
{
u(x), β
∫
I
u(y)f(y)dy
}
= max
{
x, β
∫
I
yf(y)dy
}
= max {x, βE(y)}
A standard result in search theory is that the solution strategy takes the
form of a reservation value: in the first period, the agent accepts any offer
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higher than x∗ = βE(y) and rejects any offer lower than x∗.
We then consider an agent with loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky
(1979)). In that case the utility function for a reference point r is
u(x, r) = x− r if x ≥ r
= λ(x− r) if x < r
Where λ is the parameter representing the strength of loss aversion: λ = 1
means no loss aversion and for λ > 1, the higher λ the stronger loss aversion.
In the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky, their preferred value for λ
was 2.25.
We have then two different cases to examine, depending on whether
r 6∈ Int(I) or r ∈ Int(I). In the first case, the utility function is no more
piecewise: the agent interprets any possible offer as a gain (if r ≤ xmin), or
she interprets any possible offer as a loss (if r ≥ xmax). When r ∈ Int(I),
there exists at least one possible offer strictly lower than r (this offer would
be perceived as a loss) and at least one possible offer strictly higher than r
(this offer would be perceived as a gain), so the utility function follows the
piecewise formula supra.
Exterior reference point When the reference point is outside the range
of possible offers, it implies that the utility function is no more piecewise. If
the reference point is lower than all possible offers, the agent is never in her
loss zone, and u(x, r) = x− r. The corresponding value function is
V (x) = max
{
u(x, r), β
∫
I
u(y, r)f(y)dy
}
= max
{
(x− r), β
∫
I
(y − r)f(y)dy
}
Let us define x¯ as the reservation value in the standard case and x∗(r) as
the reservation value associated with the reference point r when the agent
manifests loss aversion. x∗(r) is defined by
u(x∗(r), r) = β
∫
I
u(y, r)f(y)dy
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which we can rewrite as
x∗(r)− r = β
∫
I
(y − r)f(y)dy
And
x∗(r) = (1− β)r + βE(y) = (1− β)r + x¯
Reversely, if the reference point is higher than all possible offers, the agent
is always in her loss zone and u(x, r) = λ(x− r), so we have
u(x∗(r), r) = β
∫
I
u(y, r)f(y)dy
⇒ λ(x∗(r)− r) = β
∫
I
λ(y − r)f(y)dy
Simplifying by λ yields
x∗(r) = (1− β)r + βE(y) = (1− β)r + x¯
In both case, we end up with the same formula. We can see that the
loss aversion coefficient λ is absent in this formula: the reference point has
an impact on the reservation value, but this effect is independent from the
asymmetry between gains and losses.
Moreover, with realistic values for β (e.g. β = 0.99 for relatively high fre-
quency offers), this effect is quantatively extremely small and cannot match
the observed stickiness in prices.
This result is in line with Wakker (2010), who finds that "loss aversion
only concerns mixed prospects. Loss aversion does not affect preferences
between pure gain prospects nor preferences between pure loss prospects".
Interior reference point We have seen that when the reference point is
lower than any possible offer, we have, by construction,
u(x∗(r), r) = x∗(r)− r
and when the reference point is higher than any possible offer, we have
u(x∗(r), r) = λ(x∗(r)− r)
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When the reference point is an interior point of I, both cases may apply, de-
pending on whether the reference point is lower or higher than the reservation
value of the agent. I examine both cases in turn.
In the first case (low reference point), we have
x∗(r)−r = β
∫
I
u(y, r)f(y)dy = β
[∫
r
xmin
λ(y − r)f(y)dy +
∫
xmax
r
(y − r)f(y)dy
]
we can obviously isolate x∗(r) :
x∗(r) = r + β
[∫
r
xmin
λ(y − r)f(y)dy +
∫
xmax
r
(y − r)f(y)dy
]
I want to know if introducing loss aversion (i.e. taking λ > 1) will increase
or decrease the reservation value, so I simply take the derivative of the reser-
vation value with respect to λ, at the baseline value λ = 1:
dx∗(r)
dλ
|λ=1 = β
∫
r
xmin
(y − r)f(y)dy < 0
Introducing loss aversion decreases the reservation value.
In the second case (high reference point), we have
λ(x∗(r)− r) = β
[∫
r
xmin
λ(y − r)f(y)dy +
∫
xmax
r
(y − r)f(y)dy
]
I simplify by λ and isolate x∗(r) :
x∗(r) = r + β
[∫
r
xmin
(y − r)f(y)dy +
∫
xmax
r
1
λ
(y − r)f(y)dy
]
And therefore the derivative of the reservation value with respect to λ is
dx∗
dλ
|λ=1 =
[
β
(
−1
λ2
)∫
xmax
r
(y − r)f(y)dy
]
|λ=1 = −β
∫
xmax
r
(y−r)f(y)dy < 0
We see that from the baseline situation when λ = 1 (there is no asymmetry
between gains and losses), introducing asymmetry by increasing λ actually
decreases the reservation value.
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We might want to know what is the effect of a variation of the reference
point on the reservation value.
When the reference point is lower than the reservation value, we have
d2x∗(r)
dλdr
|λ=1 = −β < 0
As the reference point get higher, the negative effect of loss aversion on the
reservation value get stronger.
Reversely, when the reference point is higher than the reservation value,
we have
dx∗
dλ
|λ=1 = β
Here, as the reference point get higher, the negative effect of loss aversion on
the reservation value tapers off.
These results means that the effect of loss aversion on the reservation
value is maximal for a reference point close to the reservation value. This
further undermines the notion that loss aversion has a stronger effect for an
"extreme" (very high or very low) reference point.
As a guide for intuition, I computed the reservation value of an agent
drawing offers in [0; 100] with β = 0.9 for various values of λ (from λ = 1 –
standard case – to λ = 4). The Figure 1 plots the reservation value against
the reference point. As we can see, the higher the λ, the lower the reservation
value.
3 Discussion
I showed that loss aversion cannot explain why people are reluctant to
sell their house at a loss when the market has gone down since they bought
their house. An alternative explanation to this phenomenon is the anchoring
effect : when people must guess a numerical value about which they lack
information, they get influenced by numbers that come to their mind even if
these numbers are irrelevant to the case in point. The classical demonstration
of this effect is Tversky and Kahneman (1974), which finds that announcing
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Figure 1: Reservation value as a function of reference point for several values
of λ
the subjects a random number between 1 and 100 influenced their subsequent
estimate of the number of African countries in the United Nations.
In the housing market, the buying price is an obvious anchor for fixing
the reselling price. If this explanation is correct, then buying prices should
influence reselling prices in both directions : during a boom, people who have
bought their house at a low price would post a lower reselling price, which
loss aversion cannot explain. This is precisely what we observe : Case and
Shiller (1989) and Benítez-Silva, Eren, Heiland, and Jimenez-Martin (2009)
find that the buying price influence the reselling price in both directions. In
a different market, Beggs and Graddy (2009), who replicate the methodology
from Genesove and Mayer (2001) in art auctions, find a symmetric effect of
the previous buying price on the new selling price. They conclude
Reference dependence and anchoring are often used interchange-
ably. Kahneman (1992), however, defines reference dependence
as something that influences the reference point in the measure-
ment of gains and losses when they are valued asymmetrically,
anchoring as something that influences judgement of what is nor-
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mal more generally. Our evidence supports Kahneman’s defini-
tion of anchoring but does not support Kahneman’s definition of
reference dependence.
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